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Frontier Stories: Periphery as Center in Qing History 
 
Mark Elliott 
 
 
It seems impossible to begin without a reference to Owen Lattimore.  For the beginning student 
of the Chinese frontier, Lattimore is often still the first author we read.  His early writings on 
Manchuria, Mongolia, and Xinjiang – all places he knew personally from extensive travel there 
in the 1920s and 1930s – give us a captivating glimpse of an Inner Asia that, in his day, remained 
as yet little changed from the late Qing.  Laying out before us an extraordinary world both 
alluring and strange, Lattimore seems to be saying to the novice that, despite appearances, this is 
in fact a knowable world.  Which it is. 
 Though today outdated in some respects, Lattimore’s writings continue to provide an 
intellectual context in which to think about on the frontier in general, both across a broad 
temporal sweep and in comparative terms.  Indeed, as William Rowe has pointed out in a recent 
essay, Lattimore is one of the few Asianists of the 20th c. whose influence continues to be felt 
widely across all fields of history, in large measure because he pioneered an approach to the 
study of the frontier that went beyond national histories.1  In that, and in his readiness to identify 
the actions of China-based states as “imperialist” in nature, he stands as the intellectual godfather 
of all historians of China who have sought to find ways to escape the deadening hand of 
doctrinaire nation-centered narratives and who look instead for the other histories that lie 
                                                
1 Noting that Lattimore anticipated many of the developments that constitute the theoretical 
underpinnings of the “global history” that has emerged in the last couple of decades, Rowe 
writes “[T]he fact is that Lattimore remains one of the very few historians of the non-Western 
world to have helped shape the larger historical discipline in the West to any degree 
whatsoever.”  William T. Rowe, “Owen Lattimore, Asia, and Comparative History,” 782.  
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neglected along the geographical periphery of the modern Chinese state.  This group includes not 
only those scholars who study the Inner Asian frontier – the area where Lattimore’s influence 
has been the greatest, and which will provide the focus of this essay – but also those who work 
on the maritime frontiers of the east and southeast coasts and on the mountainous highland 
frontiers of the southwest.  
As Rowe reminds us, Lattimore was a man of the field, not of the archive.  He was a Big 
Idea Hunter, always searching for deep structure and ultimate causes.  His intimate knowledge of 
the people and landscapes of the frontier kept him from making easy assumptions and incautious 
generalizations, even if he sometimes lapses into what we might label essentialism, at least as 
regards China itself.  In this respect, Lattimore’s intellectual profile differs from that of Joseph 
Fletcher, probably the other most influential American scholar of Chinese frontier studies in the 
20th c.  Fletcher’s name must be mentioned, not only because his contributions to the Cambridge 
History of China volumes laid the foundation of all subsequent work done on the Qing frontier 
(at least in the north and west), but also because, unlike Lattimore, Fletcher was as much at home 
in the archive as he was on the road, and possessed a formal training in history and language that 
Lattimore never had.  Few of us born after 1930 had any hope of enjoying the same sorts of 
experiences as Lattimore and his intrepid wife, Eleanor:  traipsing in the forests and rivers of 
northern Manchuria, traveling the high roads of Mongolia on ponies and camels, riding sledges 
through the Siberian snow to Turkestan.  But we could aspire to the sort of preparation that 
Fletcher had received, even if, inevitably, we failed to match him in what we achieved.  For this 
reason, Fletcher was a model as much as he was an inspiration for those entering the field in the 
later 20th century; Lattimore, on the other hand, was an oracle. 
We know that as a rule Lattimore did not hold “book learning” or philological expertise 
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in high regard.2  Be that as it may, he and Fletcher (who were friends3) clearly agreed upon the 
importance of writing history in such a way that it reached a broad audience and made 
connections to the wider world.  Fletcher’s “airplane ride” was of course a famous illustration of 
what he called “integrative history.”4  One wonders if Fletcher would acknowledge that this was 
what Lattimore was doing when he wrote his well-known essay, “The Frontier in History,” or 
whether Fletcher would go along with Lattimore’s insistence in seeing world history in such 
strongly civilizational terms, perhaps the one dimension of his approach that seems least useful 
today.  But at a minimum we can say that in setting out the development of China’s frontiers as a 
type against which other frontiers might be compared, Lattimore was operating according to the 
same basic assumptions as Fletcher, namely, that the history of China was by no means 
exceptional, that the study of the frontier provided a key to that history, and that anyone seeking 
                                                
2 As Rowe observes: “Positively glorying in the fact that he was not a trained historian, 
[Lattimore] scoffed throughout his life at both the textual scholarship and the topical 
specialization conventionally demanded by that discipline; with characteristic pugnacity, he 
equated overreliance on textual sources with giving in to ‘authoritarian attempts to control 
opinion’ rather than relying on his own rough-and-ready ‘commonsense kind of reasoning’.” 
Rowe, “Owen Lattimore,” 761 n1. 
3 Despite Lattimore’s long residence in the United Kingdom after , the two men were on good 
terms.  Fletcher hosted Lattimore at Harvard on at least one occasion in the early 1970s (Ho-
dong Kim, personal communication), and among Lattimore’s papers at the Library of Congress 
are letters exchanged with Fletcher between 1966 and 1975. 
4 Joseph Fletcher, “Integrative History: Parallels and Interconnections in the Early Modern 
Period, 1500-1800,” 37–57. 
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to establish patterns and connections in world history would at least want to include China, if not 
in fact begin there.5    
The title of the present essay, “The Frontier in Qing History,” is thus of course an 
hommage au maître.  It does not attempt anything nearly so ambitious, however, as Lattimore in 
his famous 1955 paper, “The Frontier in History.”  Its more modest goal is to briefly outline 
some of the ways in which research on the Inner Asian frontier occupies a place of special 
significance for Qing studies, and, conversely, to describe what I see to be the significance of the 
Qing for the study of the frontier in Chinese history.  What I would like to argue is that the 
frontier story is essential to any account of China during the last three and a half centuries; not 
only it is one of the things that makes the Qing “Qing,” it is one of the things that has made 
China what it is today. 
 
Defining the jecen 
Perhaps the best place to begin is with the meanings of the term, “frontier” – a word that 
figures in the very title of this journal.  In English, as is well known, the word comes from a 
Latin military term, fronteria, indicating a front line of soldiers.  In this sense, fronteria should 
be contrasted to another Latin word, limes (pl. limites), originally a boundary in a field, or a 
fortified line guarding a marchland.6  The meaning of “frontier” as a line, or border, seems to 
                                                
5 “For an extremely regular, strongly patterned record of the processes of specialization and their 
consequences in the shaping of frontiers, the history of China maybe taken as a standard – an 
experimental, not an absolute standard – for estimating relative frontier values in the history of 
other societies and other parts of the world.” Owen Lattimore, “The Frontier in History,” 472. 
6 Fulmer Mood, “Notes on the History of the Word Frontier,” 78–83.  
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have entered English only in the 15th c., perhaps from French, to mean “a political barrier 
between states or peoples, often militarized.”7  In French, frontière continues to have this 
meaning, like Italian fronterra, German Grenze, Russian граница, or Chinese jie 界.  In English, 
however, “frontier” has over time acquired a different sense, and for well over a century now has 
carried the meaning of a peripheral zone, an unexplored area or region, perhaps very large, 
giving it a sense more akin to later meanings of the Chinese word jiang 疆.8  On this point, we 
may as well quote Lattimore, who played with both senses of the word:  “The linear frontier as it 
is conventionally indicated on a map always proves, when studied on the ground, to be a zone 
rather than a line.”9  Comparing this view to that of Frederick Jackson Turner, whose 
interpretation of the frontier had a great influence upon Lattimore, one can not only see the effect 
                                                
7 Daniel J. Power, “Introduction: Frontiers: Terms, Concepts, and the Historians of Medieval and 
Early Modern Europe,” 2. 
8 While the etymology of the word jiang points to an original meaning of a boundary, by the late 
imperial period it is frequently employed to mean a frontier region. 
9 Lattimore, “The Frontier In History,” pp. 469-70.  It should be said that scholars by no means 
agree on the interpretation of the English words “frontier” and “border.”  Though he allows that 
they may coexist, or transform from one to the other over time, Peter Sahlins clearly sees the two 
as distinctive kinds of spaces, whereas Diana Lary suggests that the difference between frontier 
and border is “not a hard and fast one,” and that border may be taken to mean, not a fixed line, 
but a “permeable, flexible, and interpenetrable” zone between two entities, a place of gradual 
transition.  See Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees, 4; 
and Diana Lary, ed., The Chinese State at the Borders, 5-6.  
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upon the latter’s thinking but also the moment (1893) at which the word “frontier” began to 
acquire this broader sense: 
The American frontier is sharply distinguished from the European frontier – a 
fortified boundary line running through dense populations.  The most significant 
thing about the American frontier is, that it lies at the hither edge of free land.  In 
the census reports it is treated as the margin of that settlement which has a density 
of two or more to the square mile.  The term is an elastic one, and for our 
purposes does not need sharp definition.  We shall consider the whole frontier 
belt, including the Indian country and the outer margin of the “settled area” of the 
census reports.10 
Lattimore, of course, adopted none of Turner’s ideas about the frontier as a crucible of rugged 
individualism, democracy, and progress, nor did he espouse the celebratory tone of continual 
outward expansion of “civilization.”  Quite the contrary: Lattimore saw the Inner Asian frontier 
much more from what Turner might have called (had he stopped to consider that such a thing 
existed) the “native” point of view – that is, a zone of contestation – which is one of the things 
that continues to make his analysis of the frontier so relevant.11  Even if the word “frontier” is 
                                                
10 Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History.”  Emphasis 
added. 
11 This is especially so in the mainland, where numerous articles on Lattimore have appeared in 
recent years.  Cf. the comment by Fudan historian Yao Dali: “Many of the succinct and astute 
observations written down several decades ago by Lattimore remain a source of inspiration for 
creative reflection by those who today research the history of the Chinese frontier” (“拉铁摩尔
在数十年前写下的不少简明扼要而充满悟性的见解，至今仍是激励着中国边疆史地研究者
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now largely being supplanted by “borderland,” it is hard to see how the difference between these 
terms in English can easily survive the translation into Chinese, or any other language, for that 
matter.  Indeed, to the degree that “borderland” implies a colonial dynamic, this introduces a 
further complicating element, which as far as I am aware has yet to be adequately addressed. 12 
                                                                                                                                                       
们从事创造性思考时的智慧泉眼”).  Cited in Huang Dayuan, “Bianjiang, minzu yu guojia: dui 
La-tie-mo-er ‘Zhongguo bianjiang guan’ de sikao,” 41. 
12 In their now-classic article, Adelman and Aron seek to differentiate “frontier” and “borderland” 
in an effort to avoid the problematic overtones of Turnerian triumphalism.  Referencing the 
major revisions in US history led respectively by Bolton and Limerick, they argue that, “By 
frontier, we understand a meeting place of peoples in which geographic and cultural borders 
were not clearly defined.”  Borderlands, on the other hand, are formed around “the contested 
boundaries between colonial domains,” such that it is “the conflicts over borderlands [that] 
shaped the peculiar and contingent character of frontier relations.”  Jeremy Adelman and Stephen 
Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders,” 815-816.  However useful this terminological distinction 
may be for the study of the American West, I do not know of an extended consideration of its 
applicability to the Inner Asian case.  If we understand the frontier as a zone of interpenetration 
and interaction, then it would appear that the primary point of differentiation between frontier 
and borderland is the overlap, and contestation, of the claims of different political authorities qua 
colonial powers.  Setting aside the question of whether the Inner Asian frontier actually lacks this 
aspect, the fact is that the same Chinese word, bianjiang, is used to translate both “frontier” and 
“borderland” in much contemporary scholarship. 
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To speak of the “native” viewpoint requires us to consider native terms.  While grossly 
undertheorized, much has been written of Chinese-language terms such as bianjiang 邊疆,13 but 
what of the Manchu word jecen?  Since this word is necessarily part of the object of any study of 
the Qing frontier, it is perhaps justified to offer a short etymological and discursive parsing of 
this key term. 
Let us begin with the dictionaries.  In her authoritative comparative dictionary of 
Tungusic languages,14 Tsintsius gives several original meanings of jecen:  межа “boundary”; 
крепость “fortress”; защита “defense, shelter, protection”; ограда, стена “fence, wall”; рубеж, 
грань, граница “boundary, border.”  In addition, she notes the existence of an attested Jurchen 
word, jece, which she defines as “border” (граница) or “periphery” (окраина).  So we can say 
with some confidence, first of all, that jecen is in fact a native Manchu word, and not a 
borrowing from Mongolian; and second, that its original sense was highly military in nature, 
very much along the lines of Latin limites.   
Looking at dictionaries compiled on the basis of Qing-period usage, however, we can 
also see that the meaning of “defensive boundary” underwent significant expansion and 
adaptation after the 17th c.  In his Comprehensive Manchu-English Dictionary, Jerry Norman 
gives “border, frontier” as the baseline definition of jecen.  He gives other compounds as well:  
                                                
13 One place to start is Zhang Shiming and Gong Shengquan, “‘Bianjiang’ yici zai shijie zhuyao 
faxizhong de jingxiang: yige yuyuan jiaodu de kaocha,” especially pp. 3-5.  Another is Fang Tie, 
“Gudai zhili bianjiang lilun yu shijian de yanjiu gouxiang.” Elsewhere, Fang has written that 
basic research on theoretical aspects of the frontier is notably behind the times.  See Fang, 
“Shilun Zhongguo bianjiangxue de yanjiu fangfa,” 21. 
14 V. I. Tsintsius, Sravnitel’nyi slovar’ tunguso-man’chzhurskikh iazykov. 
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jecen akū “limitless,” jecen dalin “shoreline,” dubei jecen “outer limit, farthest boundary,” jase 
jecen “frontier, border region,” and oyonggo jecen “important border area.”15  Hauer provides the 
same basic definitions as Norman (Begrenzung [“delimitation”], Grenze [“border”]), along with 
a few other uses, such as the translations of the five zones that formed part of the classical 
Chinese worldview: “zone of [royal] residence” (甸服, gemungge jecen), and “provincial zone” 
(候服, golonggo jecen). “zone of pacification” (綏服, bilungga jecen), harnessed zone (要服, 
siderilengge jecen), and “zone of wilderness” (荒服, lampangga jecen).16  Further clues are 
provided by Hu Zengyi, the author of the definitive Manchu-Chinese dictionary, who defines 
jecen in many different ways: bian 邊, bianyuan 邊緣, bianji 邊際, bianjie 邊界, bianjing 邊境, 
bianjiang 邊疆, biansai 邊塞, all of which are synonymous, or nearly so – but of course it is the 
“nearly so” that is troublesome.17  In addition, he provides a multitude of compounds drawn from 
his reading of original materials.  These can be broken down into four basic families of 
meaning:18  
1. administrative boundary, whether provincial, national, or other;19  
                                                
15 Jerry Norman, A Comprehensive Manchu-English Dictionary. 
16 Erich Hauer, Handwörterbuch der Mandschusprache, 2nd revised ed. 
17 Hu Zengyi, Xin Man-Han da cidian. 
 
18 An additional compound, jalan jecen (= Ch shi jie 世界, “the world”), is obviously a calque 
from Chinese, and should be held apart. 
19 Cf. the following examples:  adaki jecen 領疆 “adjacent border”; Šansi G’ansu i jecen 陝西甘
肅地界 “border of Shaanxi and Gansu”; jecen obumbi 做為邊界 “make a boundary”; jecen i 
dolo/dorgi 境內 “within the borders”; jecen ci tucibumbi 出境 “to leave/cross the border”; jecen 
 10 
2. a military line;20   
3. the frontier generally;21  
                                                                                                                                                       
be dosimbi 入境 “to enter the border”; jecen [be] daba[na]mbi 越境 “to cross the border 
illicitly”; meni jecen i ergi karun be kadalara hafasa 我主管哨所官員 “the officials managing 
the guardpost on our side of the border”; juwe gurun i jecen i urse 兩國邊境之人 “people in the 
border area of the two countries.”  To this may be added other uses: jorhon [jorgon sic] biyai ice 
duin de. jecen de isinjiha inenggi ci. Šandung ni golo de. amba nimanggi nimaraha, “On the 
fourth day of the twelfth month, from the day you arrived at the border, there was a big snow in 
Shandong province.”  From Kangxi Manwen zhupi zouzhe 康熙滿文硃批奏摺 (hereafter 
KXMaZPZZ) no. 149, memorial of Foron, KX 28.12.9.  This and other documents cited from 
these collections are held in the First Historical Archives, Beijing.  It is perhaps worth pointing 
out also that in the Manchu version of the 1727 Treaty of Kiakhta, jecen is the word used to 
describe the border between Russia and China, seen in such phrases as juwe gurun i jecen i ba 
umesi oyonggo, “the border between the two countries is very important; juwe gurun i jecen 
hešen toktobuhangge, “establishing the boundaries of the two countries.” British Library 
OMS/Add. 18106, “Treaty Between China and Russia, 1727-28, in Manchu.” 
20 Cf. the following examples: amban be hūlhai jecen de beye nikenjihe, “The official personally 
got up close to the bandits’ lines”; gabsihiyan be gaifi batai jecen de šuwe dosifi “taking the 
vanguard, he pushed straight into the enemy line.” 
21 Cf. the following examples:  jase jecen 邊陲 邊疆 “border area”; jecen i ba 邊界 “frontier”; 
wargi jecen 西域 “western frontier”; ice jecen 新疆 “new frontier”; goro/goroki jecen 遠疆 
“distant frontier”; lakcaha jecen 閉塞之地, 絕域之邊 “remote [lit. cut-off] frontier”; mederi 
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4. a particular frontier zone, especially one inhabited by a non-Han people.22  
My own search of Qing-era documents suggests that the last of these meanings could apply to 
parts of China itself.  The quotation below is from a palace memorial of the Kangxi reign: 
Si Ning, Liyang Jeo, Si An ci juwe minggan ba funceme giyalabuhabi. uttu be dahame. 
ilan jecen i cooha ci tulgiyen. dorgi ba i dzungdu. siyūn fu se. tidu. dzung bing guwan sei 
fejergi moringga cooha be emu minggan ekiyeniyebufi.23 (emphasis added) 
More than two thousand have already been seconded from Xining, Liangzhou, and Xi’an.  
Following this, apart from the soldiers of the three frontiers, a thousand mounted 
soldiers under the governors-general and governors, or under the military supervisors and 
provincial commanders of the interior provinces, have been used up. 
To judge from the distinction drawn here between ilan jecen (= Ch san jiang 三疆, “three 
frontiers”) and dorgi ba (= Ch neidi 内地, “inner lands”) and from its use in other documents,24 
                                                                                                                                                       
jecen 海疆 “maritime frontier”; jecen be bolgo obumbi 靖邊 “pacify the border.”  Another 
example, from the Qianlong era:  jecen i hafan de inu sain niyalma bahaci ombi, “It is important 
to select truly good men as frontier officials” (Qianlong Manwen zhupi zouzhe packet 72, 
memorial of Uhetu, QL3.4.9).   
22 Cf. the following examples: Tanggūt/Tubet jecen 唐古特/土伯特邊境 “Tibetan border”; 
Miyoozi jecen i ba 苗疆“Miao frontier”; Oros jecen 俄羅斯境 “Russian frontier”; Jun gar jecen 
準噶爾境 “Dzungar frontier”; Hoise jecen 回疆 “Muslim frontier.”   
23 KXMaZPZZ 355, memorial of Boji 博濟, KX 41.5.21.   
24 “Si An i ba. wargi ergi ilan jecen be alihabi. seremšeme tebuhe jakūn gūsai hafan. cooha 
holbobuhangge umesi oyonggo” (“Xi’an has supported the three western frontiers.  Everything 
 12 
the term ilan jecen seems to have been shorthand for the western border zone constituted by 
Xining, Gansu, and Ningxia.  Much later, of course, the word is applied to the newly 
incorporated territories of Dzungaria and Kashgaria (i.e., Altishahr), called in Manchu Ice 
toktobuha jecen, “newly fixed (or “pacified”) frontier,” and in Chinese simply as “Xinjiang” 新
疆, “new frontier,” in which phrase the notion of jecen as a region of some considerable size is 
quite unequivocally expressed. 
In thinking about the many ways in which jecen was used in Manchu documents, not to 
speak of the nuances in the Chinese terms for “frontier,” what we find is that providing a single, 
neat definition is impossible.  Its meanings – like the meanings of so many terms used in what 
might seem to us today “inconsistent” ways – obviously varied considerably, depending on 
context.  It would appear that the meaning changed somewhat over time, acquiring more and 
more a sense akin to that of the English “frontier,” but this is a question that will require further 
research.  Another question worth consideration is whether and how jecen differs in its meaning 
from the words used to express similar ideas in Chinese, especially when it comes to the 
translation in the Qing of documents originally in Manchu.  Though I do not investigate this 
problem in the present essay, the question is important because it points to the issue of the 
distinctiveness of the Qing frontier, a problem to which I would now like to turn. 
 
The Qing in Frontier History 
Any discussion of the place of the frontier in Qing history leads us to recall Ping-ti Ho’s 
famous 1967 essay, in which he considered the larger significance of the Qing era for Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                       
related to the Eight Banner officers and soldiers garrisoned [there] is of the utmost importance”).  
YZMaZPZZ 165, memorial of Jalangga, YZ7.11.22. 
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history.25  Many readers will be familiar with one of Ho’s main conclusions (repeated by Joseph 
Fletcher in his chapters for the Cambridge History of China), which is that the geographical 
framework of modern China was determined in the Qing, notably via the expansion, conquest, 
and consolidation of imperial territory on the frontier, particularly in Inner Asia, but also in 
Taiwan and in the southwest: 
[G]eographically China could never have reached its present dimensions without 
the laborious, painstaking, and skillful work of empire building carried out by 
Manchu rulers between 1600 and 1800. Since much of present-day China's impact 
on the outside world is due to its size and the location of its frontiers, the 
contribution of the Ch'ing period to the formation of modern China as a 
geographic and ethnic entity is of the greatest significance.26 
If it has taken some time to fully realize the implications of this conclusion – namely, that the 
history of the Qing periphery is no way peripheral to our understanding of the Chinese past (or 
present, for that matter), and that its frontier experience is what makes Qing history distinctive 
when compared to other eras of dynastic rule – doubtless this has much to do with the fact that 
for a very long time we lacked access to the primary sources necessary to undertake this research, 
and training in the relevant languages was also undervalued.  Nonetheless, as the next section of 
                                                
25 Ping-ti Ho, “The Significance of the Ch’ing Period in Chinese History,” 189-195.  In light of 
the discussion in the pages below of the “New Qing History,” it is worth noting that Ho’s essay 
appeared along with two others, by Harold Kahn and Jonathan Spence, as part of a forum on 
“New Views of Ch’ing History.”  All three papers were originally presented at a panel at the 
1966 AAS meeting in New York, sponsored by the Society for Ch’ing Studies. 
26 Ho, “The Significance,” 189. 
 14 
this essay will show, it seems now that we may be arriving at a point predicted nearly twenty 
years ago by James Millward, who wrote that while the implications of the territorial expansion 
under the Manchus had yet to be fully understood, a Qing-centered approach to policy and 
practice on the frontier would lead the field to realize “that the periphery can be central after 
all.”27   
Perhaps it is wise, then, to first step back to consider a slightly different matter – not the 
significance of the frontier for the Qing, but the significance of the Qing for Chinese frontier 
history, and whether, or in what sense, we should even be thinking of it as “Chinese” frontier 
history at all.   
This is clearly a sensitive question, since it touches directly on how one chooses to 
interpret the Qing imperial project:  Was it, as has been suggested by some, the restoration of the 
classical ideal of “grand unity,” the dayitong 大一統, a gathering together of all of “all under 
Heaven,” tianxia 天下, in a culminating manifestation of the two-millennia-old Chinese imperial 
state?28  Was it rather the re-creation of a universal order along the lines of the Mongol empire, 
another yeke ulus?  Or was it instead an early modern state in the mold of the Ottoman, Mughal, 
Safavid, and Romanov empires, all also sprawling continental domains encompassing an array of 
peoples, lands, languages, and faiths within the sovereignty of a single ruler, himself – like the 
Qing emperor – sometimes the representative of a minority group, as in the case of the Ottomans 
and Mughals?  In other words, was the Qing a Chinese dynasty (chao 朝), was it a compound, 
                                                
27 James Millward, “New Perspectives on the Qing Frontier,” 129.   
28 See, for example, Guo Chengkang, “Qingdai huangdi de Zhongguo guan,” 1-18. 
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pluralist Inner Asian state (gurun29), or was it an “empire” in a more universal sense?30  And how 
do we tell these apart? 
Up to now, one way to do this has been to evaluate the things that the empire-builders 
themselves said about what they were doing on the frontier, since conquest – which of necessity 
happens at a distance from the center – is one of the areas where policies that are recognizably 
“imperial” are most in evidence.31  By this logic, in the Qing, if, as they sometimes did, ruling 
elites said that they believed they were restoring unity, then this meant they were operating 
according in a Chinese register.  On the other hand, if they made references to Yuan-era 
precedents, or brought out symbols of Buddhist kingship, this meant they were thinking along 
different lines than those of orthodox succession (zhengtong 正統).  How much attention ought 
we be paying to the rhetoric of Qing empire-builders, anyway?  Not that what they thought they 
were doing is not important, but their view of the business of conquest and consolidation on the 
frontier was no less a matter of discursive window dressing than what participants in imperial 
projects in other parts of the world have said (or might say) to legitimate their actions.  Mere 
antiquity of rhetoric, or invocation of hallowed claims to old territories, does not in itself make 
that rhetoric apolitical or in some special sense impartial or “true.”  Tropes of imperial unity, say, 
or the transformative power of civilization, or of chakravartinhood are insistently political, even 
if people believed in them, as doubtless they did.  That is what gives them their power.  But the 
historian cannot settle for this alone. 
                                                
29 The Manchu term gurun is as liable to at least as many varying meanings as jecen.  See Mark 
Elliott, “Manchu (Re)Definitions of the Nation in the Early Qing.”  
30 See Mark Elliott, “Chuantong Zhongguo shi yige diguo ma?” 
31 Cf. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History, 28-30. 
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We would be naïve indeed if we took Qing imperial discourse –which, it should be said, 
notably lacked any word that meant “empire” – at face value.  One pitfall facing the historian 
who would go beyond Marxist-Leninist or standard nation-centered narratives to recover what 
was “imperial” about the Qing expansion into, or conquest of, the frontier is that she ends up 
simply repeating – and by repeating, reenacting on a certain level – the ideologies espoused by 
contemporary actors.  Refreshing as these might be when put alongside older interpretations, we 
gain little, I would argue, by substituting an analysis based on 18th-c. notions of “impartial 
imperial benevolence toward all people” (or any other formulation) for 20th-c. ideas of 
“oppression by the landlord class” or “reunification of the great Chinese nation.”  Such notions 
only help us understand at most one element of the center’s point of view.  Even if we grant that 
the gradual extension of Qing power into Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkestan was part of a grand 
plan of imperial unification – and Matthew Mosca’s work cautions against doing so32 – from the 
point of view of those on the frontier, it hardly seems likely that a group such as the Dzungars 
would have welcomed such a spin on their incorporation into the empire of the Great Qing, at 
least not without many qualifications.  We want to know how Ortai or Agūi or Fuk’anggan 
thought, but we do not want to limit ourselves to thinking like them.  “What did the Qing elite 
say about the dynasty’s policies on the frontier?” is not the only question we should be posing; 
we also should be asking a corollary question, “What did frontier elites say about Qing policies? 
How did they view the imperial center?”  Answering such questions is a vital step toward 
disrupting the monopoly of Sinocentric narratives.  Not that Sinocentric narratives are not 
                                                
32 “For most of the period studied in this book [18th-19th c.], Qing statesmen and scholars never 
conceived a comprehensive ‘grand strategy,’ even at the loosest and most abstract level.” 
Matthew Mosca, From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy, 11. 
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important – they most definitely are – but we must not mistake them for the sole, solitary 
interpretation of events. 
Apart from its place within the long history of the Chinese frontier, then, what might be 
another useful framework for thinking about the frontier and the gathering of the Great Qing 
lands?  Carolyn Cartier and Tim Oakes broached this issue recently when they observed that, 
“Problematizing the idea of territorial unification in China over the longue durée, and under the 
contemporary government of the People's Republic, prioritizes understanding the state through 
processes of geographical formation.”33 That is to say, to make sense of how China got to its 
present shape, it is essential to make clear just what was entailed in the exercise of sovereignty 
and to investigate the different means by which the spaces we call the frontiers of China, and the 
people living in them, were brought under the control of the imperial state, and how the process 
was carried out again in the 20th c.  In short, it is essential to historicize the frontier and to 
approach the frontier enterprise as a case of state-led, pragmatically driven reterritorialization.  In 
this project, elites from the imperial center collaborated with local elites on various peripheries, 
with varying degrees of success.  To understand the sorts of processes that unfolded on the 
frontier, and to better position ourselves to parse the discursive construct of the frontier, we 
would be better off looking closely at the movement of populations, the creation of maps, the 
selection of administrative and military personnel, the conduct of negotiations with non-Han 
actors, the fate of captives, the creation of trade networks, the working of legal systems, and the 
spread of “frontier knowledge,” among other problems.   
 This is not something that can be done as easily or equally well in all periods of history, 
but the Qing case, with ample documentation of all kinds, provides a fine opportunity to push 
                                                
33 Carolyn Cartier and Tim Oakes, “Vast Land of Borders.”  
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forward with such an agenda.  Its proximity to the modern era and the birth of the Chinese 
republics, moreover, invests it with immediate relevance, as the energetic response to the New 
Qing History that has emerged in recent years attests.34  Thanks to new work on the political and 
ideological structures of Qing rule, it is now difficult to sustain the argument that imperial 
expansion – in the Qing, or indeed, at any time in the past, was a natural process that “just 
happened.”  In this case, the iterative process of making and unmaking “China” over the 
centuries appears in a different light.35  One can see in this development the emergence of new 
approaches to the distinctive history of the Qing frontier. 
 
The Frontier and the New Qing History 
From the Han dynasty one, the frontier was obviously important to all unified Chinese states. 
What does it mean to say that it was distinctive in the Qing?  Answers to this question have 
begun to emerge in the work that began to appeared in the late 1990s that goes under the name of 
the “New Qing History” (xin Qingshi 新清史).36  This school of analysis (if indeed it can be 
                                                
34 A summary of these responses is found in Dang, Meiguo Xin Qingshi sanshinian and in Ding 
and Elliott, “Ershiyi shiji.”  
35 A similar point is elaborated in far greater detail by Ge Zhaoguang in his influential book, 
Zhaizi Zhongguo: chongjian youguan “Zhongguo” de lishi lunshu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 
2011). 
36 The earliest introduction to the New Qing History is Joanna Waley-Cohen, “The New Qing 
History.”  See also Kishimoto Mio, “The Ch’ing Dynasty and the East Asian World,” and, more 
recently, Laura Newby, “Pax Manjurica.”  In Chinese, the literature on the New Qing History is 
now quite extensive.  For a summary, see inter alia, Li Aiyong, “‘Xin Qingshi’ yu ‘Zhonghua 
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called a “school,” which is doubtful, given that some of those most closely associated with the 
New Qing History reject that association), places a strong value on the importance of non-
Chinese language sources and a comparative approach to understanding the Qing empire.  
Emphasizing the fact that the Qing state was founded and ruled by a non-Han people with strong 
connections to Inner Asia, the New Qing History calls into question one of the central tenets of 
20th-century Chinese historiography, namely, that the “secret” to Qing dynastic success lay in the 
near-complete absorption – or “Sinicization” – of the Manchus.  Rather, the persistence of a 
separate Manchu identity through to the end of the dynasty, and the creation of a particular 
hybrid imperial style, are seen as having played a crucial role in sustaining the Qing socio-
political order, both at the center and at the margins.37 
 One consequence of this shift of paradigm is the recognition by many scholars associated 
with the New Qing History of the existence of a distinctive historical identity and an orientation 
toward the frontier – most pronounced in the 17th and 18th centuries, altered somewhat in the 19th 
                                                                                                                                                       
diguo’ wenti: you yici chongji yu fanying?” and Dang Wei, Meiguo xin Qingshi sanshinian 
(1980-2010): jujue Hanzhongxin de Zhongguo shiguan de xingqi yu fazhan; see also the essays 
in volume 1 of Liu Fengyun et al., eds., Qingdai zhengzhi yu guojia rentong.  For a response to 
critics, see Ding Yizhuang and Mark Elliott, “Ershiyi shiji ruhe shuxie Zhongguo lishi: Xin 
Qingshi de yingxiang yu huiying.”  
37 Evelyn S. Rawski, “Reenvisioning the Qing: the Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese 
History.”  Rawski’s article drew a sharp response from Ping-ti Ho; see “In Defense of 
Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski’s ‘Reenvisioning the Qing’.”  This “Great 
Sinicization Debate” provoked the initial interest in the New Qing History among mainland 
scholars. 
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– that was, if not wholly free, then at least partly liberated, from the highly charged assumptions 
inherent in Chinese ideas of the “barbarian” and the whole weltanschauung encapsulated in the 
Hua-Yi zhi bian 華夷之辨.  Permitted a greater flexibility of approach, the Manchu court 
adopted institutions and policies toward managing the frontier different from those of preceding 
regimes; in so doing, they effected a far greater measure of control, and a much more ambitious 
program of sovereignty, resulting in the successful incorporation of the territories of Inner Asia 
into the empire.38  Significantly, while the Chinese rhetoric of “grand unity” (dayitong 大一統) 
                                                
38 A representative list of works contributing to this revised interpretation of the Qing would 
include the following: Evelyn Rawski, The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial 
Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); James Millward, Beyond the Pass: 
Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998); Pamela Kyle Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing 
Imperial Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Edward J.M. Rhoads, 
Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican 
China, 1861-1928 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000); Philippe Forêt, Mapping 
Chengde: The Qing Landscape Enterprise (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000); Mark 
C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise: 
Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2002); Nicola Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu Bao, Manchu-Mongol Relations on the Eve of the Qing 
Conquest: A Documentary History (Leiden: Brill, 2003); Patricia Berger, Empire of Emptiness: 
Buddhist Art and Political Authority in Qing China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
2003); Hodong Kim, Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and the State in Chinese Central 
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was undeniably present in the Qing approach to governance (it runs throughout the Dayi juemi lu, 
for instance), the Manchus did not rule solely as Chinese, or so the argument goes.  Rather, they 
developed different strategies of rule for the different parts of the realm that fell to them and 
were not bothered by inconsistencies or asymmetries.39  Indeed, the asymmetrical structure of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); James Millward, et al., eds.  New Qing 
Imperial History: The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde (New York: Routledge, 
2004); Peter Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia, 1600–1800 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Laura Newby, The Empire and the Khanate: 
A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand (Leiden: Brill, 2005); Johan Elverskog, Our 
Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism, and the State in Late Imperial China (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2006); Pamela K. Crossley, Helen Siu, and Donald Sutton, eds., 
Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2006); Michael Chang, A Court on Horseback: Imperial Touring 
and the Construction of Ethno-Dynastic Rule in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Asia Center, 2007); Mark Elliott, Emperor Qianlong: Son of Heaven, Man of the World 
(Pearson/Longman, 2009). 
39 Cf. Waley-Cohen: “Central to this revised understanding is the new Qing history’s revelation 
that at the height of their power, the Qing regarded China not so much as the center of their 
empire, as only a part, albeit a very important part, of a much wider dominion that extended far 
into the Inner Asian territories of Mongolia, Tibet, the Northeast (today sometimes called 
Manchuria) and Xinjiang, or Chinese (Eastern) Turkestan.”  “The New Qing History,” 194-195. 
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Qing empire helped make it what it was.  In this respect, the Qing was much like other early 
modern empires, whether or not it was “early modern” itself.40  
Now, it is one thing to point to the success of the Qing state on the frontier and another to 
say that it was because the Qing approached the frontier differently that it was successful, or that 
it was successful because the people in charge were themselves from the frontier.  Perhaps they 
followed the same policies as the Ming, but just did a better job of executing them?  (After all, in 
one form or another, a system of “tribute” relations remained in place for much of the Qing, even 
if it was not applied uniformly.)  If the argument for the singularity of the Qing frontier is to be 
successfully put, it would seem to follow that the case must be made that a) Qing policies and 
institutions were indeed different from that of the Ming or other regimes and that b) the reason 
they were different was because the people in charge of developing those policies and 
institutions thought not strictly according to Chinese imperial precedents but were open to novel 
methods of governance based either on other biases traceable to the Inner Asian world or on a 
familiarity with local conditions based on intimate knowledge of the frontier.    
In recent years, these and many other aspects of the Qing imperial imagination have 
attracted the attention of a younger generation of historians, whose work is just now beginning to 
be published; some is available as articles, but much of it remains in dissertation form.  Broadly 
                                                
40 Confirming Matthew Mosca’s argument that, “no political, cultural-ideological, or economic 
factor fundamentally divided the reasoning of Qing strategists from that of their peers in other 
contemporary Eurasian empires.”  See Mosca, From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy, 9. 
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speaking, the scholarship of this “New Qing History 2.0”41 is characterized by a deep immersion 
in Qing-era archives, including not only Chinese- and Manchu-language materials, but also those 
written in Mongolian, Tibetan, and Chaghatay.  Consciously reflective of the theoretical and 
historiographical issues raised by the New Qing History – in particular those relating to the 
specificities of Manchu rule and its implications for modern Chinese history – this new work 
seeks to integrate the history of the Qing with broader trends in global history,42 economic 
                                                
41 Credit for this formulation goes to Liu Wenpeng of the Qing History Institute of Renmin 
University.  See his comments at a talk presented by the author at Central Minzu University in 
Beijing in August 2013, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GQcDr7LzHSs. 
42 Loretta E. Kim, “Marginal Constituencies: Qing Borderland Policies and Vernacular Histories 
of Five Tribes on the Sino-Russian Frontier” (unpublished dissertation, Harvard University, 
2009); David Brophy, “Tending to Unite? The Origins of Uyghur Nationalism” (unpublished 
dissertation, Harvard University, 2011) and “The Junghar Mongol Legacy and the Language of 
Loyalty in Qing Xinjiang,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 73. 2 (Dec 2013), 231-258; 
Matthew W. Mosca, “Empire and the Circulation of Frontier Intelligence: Qing Conceptions of 
the Ottomans,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 70.1 (Jun 2010), 147-207, and From Frontier 
Policy to Foreign Policy (Stanford University Press, 2013); Benjamin Levey, “Jungar Refugees 
and the Making of Empire on Qing China’s Kazakh Frontier, 1759-1773” (unpublished 
dissertation, Harvard University, 2014); Mario Cams, “The Early Qing Geographical Surveys 
(1708–1716) as a Case of Collaboration between the Jesuits and the Kangxi Court,” Sino-
Western Cultural Relations Journal 34 (2012), 1–20. 
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history,43 environmental history,44 legal history,45 cultural studies,46 history of the book,47 art 
                                                
43 Seonmin Kim, “Borders and Crossings: Trade, Diplomacy and Ginseng Between Qing China 
and Choson Korea” (unpublished dissertation, Duke University, 2006) and “Ginseng and Border 
Trespassing Between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea,” Late Imperial China 28.1 (Jun 2007), 33-
61; Elif Akçetin, “Corruption at the Frontier: The Gansu Fraud Scandal” (unpublished 
dissertation, University of Washington, 2007); Kwangmin Kim, “Saintly Brokers: Uyghur 
Muslims, Trade, and the Making of Qing Central Asia, 1696-1814” (unpublished dissertation, 
University of California, Berkeley, 2008); Yulian Wu, “Tasteful Consumption: Huizhou Salt 
Merchants and Material Culture in Eighteenth-Century China” (unpublished dissertation, 
University of California, Davis, 2012); Devon M. Dear, “Marginal Revolutions: Economies and 
Economic Knowledge in a Chinese-Russian Borderland, 1860-1911” (unpublished dissertation, 
Harvard University, 2014). 
44 Jonathan Schlesinger, “The Qing Invention of Nature: Environment and Identity in Northeast 
China and Mongolia, 1750-1850” (unpublished dissertation, Harvard University, 2012). 
45 Pär Cassel, Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-
Century China and Japan (Oxford University Press, 2012); Xiangyu Hu, “The Juridical System 
of the Qing Dynasty in Beijing, 1644-1900” (unpublished dissertation, University of Minnesota, 
2011); Huan Tian, “Governing Imperial Borders: Insights from the Study of the Implementation 
of Law in Qing Xinjiang” (unpublished dissertation, Columbia University, 2012); Max 
Oidtmann, “Between Patron and Priest: Amdo Tibet under Qing Rule, 1792-1911” (unpublished 
dissertation, Harvard University, 2014); Eric Schluessel, “The Muslim Emperor of China: 
Everyday Encounter in Law and Ritual in Xinjiang, 1877-1933 (unpublished paper, 2013).  
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history,48 population history,49 and history of science and medicine.50  This work is 
                                                                                                                                                       
46 Andrea Goldman, Opera and the City: The Politics of Culture in Beijing, 1770-1900 (Stanford 
University Press, 2012); Elena Chiu, “The Origins and Original Language of Manchu 
Bannermen Tales (zidishu),” CHINOPERL 30.1 (Jun 2011), 1–23 and Bannerman Tales 
(Zidishu): Manchu Storytelling and Cultural Hybridity in Late Imperial China (Harvard 
University Asia Center Press, forthcoming). 
47 Devin Fitzgerald, “Manchu-Language Textbooks as a Qing Technology of Empire” 
(unpublished paper, 2014) and Mårten Söderblom Saarela, “The Manchu Script and Information 
Management: Some Aspects of Qing China’s Great Encounter with Alphabetic Literacy,” in 
Benjamin Elman, ed., Rethinking East Asian Languages, Vernaculars, and Literacies, 1000–
1919 (Brill, 2014).  
48 Tsultem Uranchimeg, “Ikh Khuree: A nomadic monastery and the later Buddhist art of 
Mongolia” (unpublished dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2009); Kristina 
Kleutghen, Imperial Illusions: Crossing Pictorial Boundaries in Eighteenth-Century China 
(University of Washington Press, forthcoming); Wen-hsing Chou, “The Visionary Landscape of 
Wutai Shan in Tibetan Buddhism from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century” (unpublished 
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2011); Kevin Greenwood, “Yonghegong: 
Imperial universalism and the art and architecture of Beijing’s ‘Lama Temple’” (unpublished 
dissertation, University of Kansas, 2013). 
. 
49 Shuang Chen, “Where Urban Migrants Met Rural Settlers: State Categories, Social 
Boundaries, and Wealth Stratification in Northeast China, 1815-1913” (unpublished dissertation, 
University of Michigan, 2009); Yi Wang, “Transforming the Frontier: Land, Commerce, and 
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complemented by ongoing research by younger scholars writing in Japanese and Chinese, such 
as Sugiyama Kiyohiko, Cheng Zhi, Onuma Takahiro, Erdenchulu Khohchahar, Qiu Yuanyuan, 
Lin Shixuan, Tsai Wei-chieh, and Zhao Huanxi, among others.51  While not all of this work is 
                                                                                                                                                       
Chinese Colonization in Inner Mongolia, 1700-1911” (unpublished dissertation, University of 
Chicago, 2013). 
50 Cathérine Jami, The Emperor’s New Mathematics: Western Learning and Imperial Authority 
in the Kangxi Reign (Oxford University Press, 2012); Beatriz Puente-Ballesteros, “Jesuit 
Medicine in the Kangxi Court: Imperial Networks and Patronage,” East Asia Science, 
Technology, and Medicine 34 (2011), 86-162; He Bian, “Too Sick to Serve: The Politics of 
Illness in the Qing Civil Bureaucracy,” Late Imperial China 33.2 (Dec 2012), 40-75; Carla 
Nappi, “Listing Bodies: Early Modern Manchu Medicine and the Inventory as Epistemic Form” 
(unpublished paper, 2013); Sare Aricanli, “Plurality in Qing Imperial Medicine: Examining 
Institutional Formations Beyond the Imperial Medical Bureau,” Asia Pacific: Perspectives 12.1 
(Fall/Winter 2013-14). 
51 Sugiyama Kiyohiko, “Dai Shin teikokushi kenkyū no genzai: Nihon ni okeru gaikyō to tenbō,” 
Tōyō bunka kenkyū 10 (Mar 2008) and “Dai Shin teikoku no shiai kōzō to hakkisei: Manju ōchō 
toshite no kokusei shiron,” Chūgokushi gakkai 18 (Dec 2008); Cheng Zhi, Daichin gurun to sono 
jidai: teikoku no keisei to hakki shakai (Nagoya University Press, 2009); Onuma Takahiro, “250-
Year History of the Turkic-Muslim Camp in Beijing,” University of Tokyo Central Eurasian 
Research Series 2 (2009); Erdenchulu Khokhchahar, “Shindai Haruchin Mongoru no yugiki ni 
okeru saihan,” Tohoku Ajia kenkyū 16 (2012); Qiu Yuanyuan, Qingqianqi gongting liyue yanjiu 
(Beijing: SSAP, 2012); Lin Shixuan, “Shiba shiji Man-Meng yuwen jiaoliu chutan: yi Man-
Meng-Han santizishu yinxie Mengwen wei zhongxin,” Mengguyu yanjiu 10 (Aug 2010); Tsai 
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necessarily focused on the frontier as such, the cumulative effect of this new wave of scholarship 
is the ineluctable reshaping of our overall understanding of Qing political, intellectual, cultural, 
linguistic, spatial, and social developments.  The resulting transformation of the framework 
within which the history of Qing China is being written means the integration, to an 
unprecedented degree, of the people, languages, beliefs, and material culture of the imperial 
frontiers into the stories we tell.   
 
Conclusion  
To conclude, I would like to consider the question of Qing frontier identity from an 
entirely different angle, that of subjective affect, which as yet has been little studied. For this, I 
turn to a poem from the middle of the 19th century, written by the bannerwoman Nasun Lan-bao 
(Na-xun Lan-bao 那遜蘭保) (1825-1873).  Born in Khuree (Manchu Kuren, Chinese Ku-lun 庫
倫, modern-day Ulan Bator), Lan-bao belonged to the Borjigit clan of the Khalkha Mongols.  
Her father, Dorje Wangchuk, was a minor official in the service of Tushiyetu khan, one of four 
khans descended from Dayan khan and the first Khalkha leader to come over to the Qing in 1686. 
52  In 1828 Dorje Wangchuk was summoned to Beijing to serve in the imperial guard, and moved 
with his family to the capital, taking up residence with the family of his wife, of the Feimo clan.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Wei-chieh, “Zhimin dang’an yu diguo xinggou: lun Qingchao Manwen zouzhezhong dui Taiwan 
shufan de biaoshu,” Taiwanshi yanjiu 15.3 (2008), ; and Zhao Huanxi, “Qingdai Beijing qimin 
fencheng er ju zhengce de shishi ji qi yingxiang,” Zhongguo lishi dili luncong (Jan 2013).  
52 Dorje Wangchuk’s mother was Manchu, a grandniece of Qianlong, and one of his 
grandmothers was a grandniece of Kangxi.  So Dorje Wangchuk, legally a Mongol and with a 
Tibetan name, was in fact more than half Manchu, but he was not a bannerman. 
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Lan-bao was then four sui.  Raised by her Manchu grandmother, of the Wanyan clan, she spent 
the rest of her life in Beijing, eventually marrying a Manchu bannerman, an undistinguished 
member of the imperial clan.  Her son, Shengyu (jinshi 1877), however, had a distinguished 
career, and published a compilation of his mother’s poems under the title Preserved Poems of the 
Hall of Fragrant Rue (Yunxiangguan yishi 蕓香館遺詩) in 1874.53   
The following verse, written by Lan-bao to her brother when he took up an assignment to 
serve in Khuree, probably some time in the 1850s, is taken from that collection.  It presents an 
unusual combination of longing and dread, pride and shame, lifting a veil on the complex 
identity of one individual, and simultaneously on the identity of the empire in which she lived. 
 
瀛俊⼆二兄奉使庫倫，故吾家也，送⾏行之⽇日率成此詩  
 
四歲來京師，卅載辭故鄉。故鄉在何所，塞北雲茫茫。  
成吉有遺譜，庫倫余故疆。彎弧⼗十萬眾，天驕⾃自古強。  
⼣夕宿便氈幕，朝餐⽢甘湩漿。幸逢⼤大⼀一統，中外無邊防。  
帶⼑刀⼊入宿衛，列爵襲冠裳。⾃自笑閨閣質，早易時世妝。  
無夢到鞍⾺馬，有意⼯工⽂文章。綠窗事粉黛，紅燈勤縹緗。  
華夷隔⾵風氣，故國為殊⽅方。問以啁哳語，遜謝稱全忘。  
我兄承使命，將歸畫錦堂。乃作異域視，舉家⼼心彷徨。  
                                                
53 For this information on Nasun Lanbao, I rely on Du Jiaji, “Qingdai Mengguzu nüshiren Na-
xun Lan-bao ji qi xiangguan wenti kaozheng.”  Also Ding Yizhuang, Qingdai Menggu nüshiren 
Na-xun Lan-bao de shenshi yu xiezuo,” and Wilt Idema, “A Mongolian Li Qingzhao?”  I am 
grateful to them for permission to quote from their work. 
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我獨有⼀一⾔言，臨⾏行奉離觴。天⼦子守四夷，原為捍要荒。  
近聞頗柔懦，醇俗醨其常。所愧⾮非男⼈人，歸願無由償。  
冀兄加振厲，舊業須重光。勿為兒⼥女泣，相對徒悲傷。 
 
A Poem Dashed Off the Day I Said Good-bye to My Second Elder Brother, Yingjun, Who Was 
Appointed to Kuren, Our Former Home54  
 
At the age of four I came here to the capital; 
Thirty years I’ve been away from our old hometown. 
Where is that hometown? 
North of the passes, lost in the clouds. 
We are descendants of Chinggis Khan, 
So Kuren has long been our domain. 
 
A hundred thousand who draw the bow— 
Of old we are strong, the proud children of Tenggeri! 
At night we sleep simply in felt tents; 
For breakfast we’ll happily have frozen milk. 
 
Today, we are fortunate to live in an age of imperial unity, 
Where no borders divide within and without. 
                                                
54 This translation is based upon that in Idema, “A Mongolian Li Qingzhao?” with minor editing 
based on my reading of the original.  My thanks to Ding Yizhuang for her contributions and 
guidance. 
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Carrying his sword, [our father] served in the guard, 
And was ennobled with an inherited rank. 
I’m just inner quarters’ material – it’s funny how 
For so long now I have dressed fashionably. 
I’ve never dreamed of riding a saddled horse, 
All my ambition is focused on high literature. 
 
By day I busy myself with cosmetics in my chamber, 
And at night I devote myself to my books. 
Chinese and Barbarian are distinguished by manner and style: 
My old country is now an unfamiliar place to me. 
When you speak to me in that chirruping language, 
I have to confess I have forgotten it completely! 
 
Now you have received this appointment, 
And you will return home, covered in glory. 
But we look upon the place as a strange land, 
And the whole family is filled with fear. 
 
As I offer you this parting drink, now that you are leaving, 
The only thing I want to say to you is this: 
The emperor rules the four barbarians, 
Just so they may protect us against the wasteland beyond. 
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Recently, I hear, they are very docile and submissive, 
And their honest customs are better than normal. 
 
To my regret, I am not a man, so my desire 
To go back there will never be fulfilled. 
I hope that you, brother, will make an extra effort 
To restore our inheritance to its former glory. 
Let us not cry sentimental tears like women, 
And vainly indulge in sadness and grief. 
There is much to reflect on here as far as the interiorization of the frontier is concerned: the 
reference to imperial rule; the absence of borders dividing the center from the periphery; the 
distinction between Chinese (Hua) and Barbarian (Yi); Mongolia both as erstwhile home and at 
the same time as a “strange land,” its people speaking a “chirruping tongue” no longer 
intelligible to the author.  And while there is something of the flavor of the Tang frontier poem 
about it – “the four barbarians . . . are very docile and submissive,” not to mention the typical 
“parting drink” farewell to one departing for distant lands – the dominant tone is marked by the 
author’s nostalgic pride in her frontier heritage (“We are descendants of Chinggis Khan . . . the 
proud children of Tenggeri”), combined with a poignant recognition of alienation from her roots 
in the steppe with its simple ways, where one sleeps in tents and awakes to a bowl of fresh milk. 
 To analyze this poem fully is not my purpose; rather, I offer it as evidence of the 
emergence of a distinctive Qing sensibility on the northern frontier.  For surely this is a 
composition that could not possibly have been written under a native Chinese dynasty:  no one 
associated with Ming (or Song) court culture would ever have composed a wistful verse in 
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Chinese about her “old home” in Mongolia.  A Mongol poet (if there were one) living in China 
in the Yuan might have waxed longingly about the lost pleasures of nomadic life, but he 
probably would have been a man, and would probably not have been able to write in Chinese.  
Lan-bao’s poem encourages us to think critically about the many different ways in which the 
frontier territories of the Qing state were given a truly different meaning under Manchu rule, a 
meaning that they would not have had under the Jin or Liao, when the southern lands remained 
beyond their grasp.   
 Lan-bao’s words show that the frontier, as a site of empire-making in the Qing, was at 
once familiar and alien, known and unknown.  For her and for other members of the conquest 
elite, regardless of gender, the frontier was a place of close personal identification, in which one 
might both find oneself and lose oneself.  As such, Lan-bao’s poem can be said to be a site of 
empire-making itself – one reason why it is important for us as modern-day historians to take the 
literary as well as the archival measure of the Qing frontier/jecen/bianjiang if we are to 
incorporate its full range of meanings in our work and place it in proper context within the 
stories of China and of empire that are now being written. 
 
 
